



Team incentives in public organisations
An experimental study
Jana Vyrastekova, Sander Onderstal and Pierre Koning
The responsibility for the contents of this CPB Discussion Paper remains with the author(s)CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
Van Stolkweg 14
P.O. Box 80510
2508 GM The Hague, the Netherlands
Telephone +31 70 338 33 80
Telefax +31 70 338 33 50
Internet www.cpb.nl
ISBN 90-5833-265-9Abstract in English
Using a simple production game, we investigate whether public ﬁrms perform better when they
increase the power of their workers’ incentive schemes. In a laboratory experiment, subjects
choose between a ‘public ﬁrm’ and a ‘private ﬁrm’ with team and individual incentives,
respectively. When exposed to individual incentives, workers in the public ﬁrm increase effort in
one parametrisation, but show a decrease in another. One reason for the latter observation is that
reciprocators self-select in the public ﬁrm, rendering cooperation proﬁtable.
Abstract in Dutch
In dit paper onderzoeken we middels een (laboratorium-)experiment de effectiviteit van
prestatieprikkels bij publieke organisaties. Deelnemers aan het experiment kunnen kiezen tussen
een ‘publieke’ en ‘private’ organisatie, met als verschil dat binnen de publieke organisatie
teambeloning wordt toegepast; binnen de private organisatie daarentegen individuele
prestatiebeloning. De introductie van individuele prestatiebeloning leidt bij de publieke
organisatie tot gemengde resultaten. Individuele beloning heeft vooral kwalijke effecten wanneer
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A restructuring of the public sector often involves proposals to increase the power of employees’
incentive schemes. Recent examples of such proposals are with respect to teachers, employment
ofﬁces, and medical practices. A priori, however, it is not clear whether high-powered incentives
do improve performance under all circumstances. It is only if each worker’s output is easy to
measure with reasonable precision, and the interdependencies among workers’ activities are low
or undesirable that payments based on individual performance can be effective. In addition, the
introduction of performance-based incentives may affect the composition of workers in public
ﬁrms: better skilled workers may decide to join a ﬁrm that has switched to performance related
pay, yet at the same time workers that are motivated to cooperate may decide to leave such ﬁrms.
Still, the effect of self-selection is hardly explored in the literature. We intend to ﬁll this gap.
In this paper, we investigate whether public ﬁrms perform better when they increase the
power of their workers’ incentive schemes. We do so using a laboratory experiment, allowing us
to isolate the effect of the power of the incentive scheme on a worker’s performance from other
effects, particularly those related to self-selection of worker types to ﬁrms with high and low
powered incentive schemes. In the experiment, subjects ﬁrst choose between a ‘public ﬁrm’ and
a ‘private ﬁrm’. In these ﬁrms, workers perform two tasks in a simple production game. In Task
1, they produce their own output, while in Task 2, they increase the output of the colleague in
their team. The ﬁrms pay their employees on the basis of both team performance and individual
performance. The power of the incentive scheme increases if individual performance has a
higher weight in a worker’s payment, so that, in equilibrium, workers realise higher output.
Team performance has a higher weight in the public ﬁrm than in the private ﬁrm, and hence the
public ﬁrm has the lower-powered incentive scheme.
After 10 rounds of production in the ﬁrm they choose, all subjects participate in 10 more
rounds and are paid according to the private ﬁrms payment scheme. A priori, it is not clear
whether the performance of public ﬁrms will improve after the change of incentives. The higher
power of the private ﬁrms’ scheme may induce workers to exert more effort in Task 1. However,
this effect may be counterbalanced because workers no longer have the incentive to reward their
colleague for high effort in Task 1 with high effort in Task 2. In other words, reciprocal
behaviour is not triggered by the private ﬁrm’s incentive scheme because money-maximising
workers exert high effort in Task 1 in the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. The latter effect
may be strong because in the self-selection process, reciprocators may be more likely to choose
to work for a public ﬁrm than money-maximisers. We let subjects submit strategies in the trust
game to measure trust and reciprocity.
Our experimental ﬁndings show that increasing the power of the incentive scheme has
ambiguous effects: workers in the public ﬁrm increase effort in one parameterisation, but show a
decrease in another. In both parameterisations, we mainly observe high effort in Task 1 and low
7effort in Task 2 under the private ﬁrm’s payment scheme, while the opposite is true for the public
ﬁrm. In the public ﬁrm, however, we ﬁnd that a substantial fraction of the subjects opt for high
effort in both tasks. The payment scheme's effect on total effort depends on the parameterisation.
In the second parameterisation, where worker interdependencies are relatively strong, we ﬁnd
the total effort to be higher in de public ﬁrm. This suggests that reciprocal behaviour can be
triggered and is beneﬁcial when workers have to rely on the effort of co-workers. Indeed, the
possibility to select the incentive scheme improves the economic performance of the public ﬁrm
in the second parameterisation. We also observe that trust and reciprocity explain subjects’
behaviour. The more a subject trusts and the higher her propensity to reciprocate: (1) the more
likely it is that she will choose the public ﬁrm and (2) the more effort she will exert in Task 2.
The policy implications of our experiment are as follows: A public ﬁrm may or may not
perform better if the power of workers’ incentive schemes is increased. If the interdependency
between workers is high and difﬁcult to observe, a higher-powered incentive scheme may imply
worse outcomes. For example, one may think of case managers at employment services, who
often have to rely on their mutual expertise to ﬁnd suitable jobs for their clients. Similar
interdependencies may exist between medical doctors, or police ofﬁcers. In contrast, when the
gain from the unobservable tasks is low, then introducing individualistic incentives is the
preferred choice. Another policy option is to strengthen the advantages of team pay, that is,
develop sorting mechanisms to attract reciprocal workers, or strengthen signalling mechanisms
within the organisation.
81 Introduction
A restructuring of the public sector often involves proposals to increase the power of employees’
incentive schemes (Dixit (2002)). Recent examples of such proposals are with respect to
teachers, employment ofﬁces, and medical practices (see Burgess and Ratto (2003) for a survey).
A priori, however, it is not clear whether high-powered incentives do improve performance. As
Gibbons (1998) argues in his review, high-powered incentives certainly have an impact on a
worker’s performance. However, he acknowledges that employers get ‘what they pay for’ : it is
only if each worker’s output is easy to measure with reasonable precision, and the
interdependencies among workers’ activities are low or undesirable that payments based on
individual performance can be effective (see also Lazear (2000a)). This is precisely the problem
in the public sector because public ﬁrms face measurability problems and complex multi-tasking
(Besley and Ghatak (2003)), which often ‘make inappropriate the naive application of magic
bullet solutions like competition or performance-based incentives’ (Dixit (2002), p. 697). In
addition, the introduction of performance-based incentives may affect the composition of
workers in public ﬁrms. As a result, better skilled workers may decide to join a ﬁrm that has
switched to performance related pay, yet at the same time workers that are motivated to
cooperate may decide to leave such ﬁrms. Still, the effect of self-selection is hardly explored in
the literature.1 We intend to ﬁll this gap.
In this paper, we investigate whether public ﬁrms perform better when they increase the
power of their workers’ incentive schemes. We do so using a laboratory experiment in which
subjects ﬁrst choose between a ‘public ﬁrm’ and ‘private ﬁrm’ in a labour market. In the ﬁrms,
workers perform two tasks in a simple production game. In Task 1, they produce their own
output, while in Task 2, they increase the output of the colleague in their team. The ﬁrms pay
their employees on the basis of both team performance and individual performance. We say that
the power of the incentive scheme increases if individual performance has a higher weight in a
worker’s payment, so that in equilibrium, workers realise higher output. Team performance has a
higher weight in the public ﬁrm than in the private ﬁrm, and hence the public ﬁrm has the
lower-powered incentive scheme.
After 10 rounds of production in the ﬁrm they choose, all subjects participate in 10 more
rounds and are paid according to the private ﬁrm’s payment scheme. A priori, it is not clear
whether the performance of public ﬁrms will improve after the change of incentives. The higher
power of the private ﬁrms’ scheme may induce workers to expend more effort in Task 1 because
they obtain a higher payment for their own output. However, this effect may be counterbalanced
because workers no longer have the incentive to reward their colleague for high effort in Task 1
1 Notable exceptions are Lazear (2000a) (in a ﬁeld study) and Keser and Montmarquette (2004) (in a laboratory
experiment).
9with high effort in Task 2. In other words, reciprocal behaviour is not triggered by the private
ﬁrm’s incentive scheme because money-maximising workers exert high effort in Task 1 in the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The latter effect may be strong because in the self-selection
process, reciprocators may be more likely to choose to work for a public ﬁrm than
money-maximisers. We let subjects submit strategies in the trust game to measure trust and
reciprocity.
The reason for turning to experimental methodology is obvious when considering the
measurement and identiﬁcation problems that are connected to empirical data. Measurement
problems may, for instance, arise in connection to workers’ output and even if output is
measurable, the researcher has no information on an individual’s effort and preferences.
Identiﬁcation problems occur because it is not straightforward to isolate the effect of the power
of the incentive scheme on a worker’s performance from other effects (Prendergast (1999)). In
contrast, in the laboratory we can observe the effort expended by the subject and measure her
preferences, and we can expose the same individual to different payment schemes and observe
her reaction, while keeping the rest of the environment constant.
Our experimental ﬁndings show that increasing the power of the incentive scheme has
ambiguous effects: workers in the public ﬁrm increase effort in one parametrisation but show a
decrease in another. In both parametrisations, we mainly observe high effort in Task 1 and low
effort in Task 2 under the private ﬁrm’s payment scheme. In the public ﬁrm, however, we ﬁnd
that a substantial fraction of the subjects opt for high effort in both tasks. The payment scheme’s
effect on total effort depends on the parametrisation. In the second parametrisation, where
workers have better incentives to cooperate, we ﬁnd the total effort to be higher in de public ﬁrm.
This suggests that reciprocal behaviour can be triggered and can be beneﬁcial when workers
have to rely on the effort of co-workers. Indeed, the possibility to select the incentive scheme
improves the economic performance of the public ﬁrm in the second parametrisation. We also
observe that trust and reciprocity explain subjects’ behaviour quite well. The more a subject
trusts and the higher her propensity to reciprocate (1) the more likely it is that she will choose
the public ﬁrm and (2) the more effort she will exert in Task 2. We develop a game-theoretic
model to explain why trust and reciprocity inﬂuence subjects’ behaviour.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 1.1, we discuss related
literature. Section 2 contains the theoretical analysis of the production game. In section 3, we
discuss the design of the experiment and our hypotheses. Section 4 includes the experimental
observations. Section 5 concludes the paper.
101.1 Related literature
In this subsection we review some of the extensive literature on incentive schemes. Several
empirical papers compare team and individual performance based payment schemes. Theory
predicts that team incentives are low-powered because they will lead to free-rider problems:
workers fail to internalise the beneﬁts their effort has on others (Lazear (2000b)). Burgess et al.
(2003) (employment service providers) and Vollaard (2003) (the police) conﬁrm the presence of
free-riding under team incentives. It seems, however, that the team is too broadly deﬁned in
these papers. For instance, in Burgess et al. (2003), teams comprise of up to 17 different and
geographically distant ofﬁces in the UK.
Moreover, the literature offers mechanisms which explain why team incentives may work
quite well in small teams. These mechanisms include mutual monitoring coupled with an easy
information ﬂow among team members and options for subjects to reciprocate among each other
within a team (Kandel and Lazear (1992)). Indeed, Ittner and Pizzini (2005) (physicians), Lavy
(2002) (teachers), and Knez and Simester (2001) (airlines) all provide evidence on teams in
which team incentives do perform well.
Several experimental studies investigate individualistic and team-based payment schemes.
Van Dijk et al. (2001) compare the outcomes of imposed individualistic, team, and tournament
payment schemes in a real effort experiment. They ﬁnd that the effort expended in teams is on
average the same as that under individualistic pay, though the variance is higher. Tournaments
elicit the highest effort and variance. Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) also compare payment
schemes based on team and individualistic performance. They document that the team
performance schemes perform much worse due to free riding, and the difference is even
increasing over time.
To our knowledge, only Keser and Montmarquette (2004), like in our design, allow subjects
to choose their payment scheme. They let the subject stay in the same two-player team for the
duration of the experiment. By construction, the maximum payoff is higher under team
incentives than under individualistic incentives. In this set-up, team incentives are popular, and
frequently lead to high output. In our experiment, team incentives are a priori less attractive than
in Keser and Montmarquette because in our design, the socially optimal payoff a subject can
earn in the public ﬁrm is the same as in the private ﬁrm. Moreover, subjects are randomly
rematched after each production game so that trigger strategies cannot explain the instances of
cooperation we observe.
Several papers show that ‘social preferences’ are important in people’s decision making and
may affect the success of incentive schemes. The experimental work by Ostrom et al. (1992) and
Fehr and Gächter (2000) on social dilemma games lends considerable weight to the
pervasiveness of reciprocal preferences among humans. Their ﬁndings support the observation
that team incentives can be successful. Minkler (2002) discusses other reasons why
11low-powered incentive schemes perform well, including ‘work moral’, intrinsic motivation, and
positive reinforcement. In questionnaires, workers indicate that they very much appreciate
non-pecuniary motivations like intrinsic incentives to perform the job (Deci (1971) and Frey and
Jegen (2001)) as well as a fair relationship with the employer (Fehr and Schmidt (2004)). In a
theoretical model, Francois (2000) shows that in the presence of ‘public service motivation’ , the
government might prefer a public ﬁrm over a private ﬁrm to provide a public service, in order to
elicit high effort from the motivated agents. In a similar setting, Delfgaauw and Dur (2004) show
that public ﬁrms optimally attract motivated workers if effort is veriﬁable, and both motivated
and ‘ lazy’ ones if it is not. Canton (2005) presents a multiple-task principal-agent model in
which some agents are intrinsically motivated for the job they perform. He shows that
high-powered incentives may not be optimal because they crowd-out intrinsic motivation.
Fehr and Schmidt (2004) study reciprocity in an experiment in which an employer offers a
payment scheme to an employee. In their two-task production game, only the output of the ﬁrst
task is contractible, i.e. veriﬁable in court. The output of the second task is observable as well,
but not veriﬁable. The employer can choose between a piece-rate contract (based on veriﬁable
output only) and a contract which pays a ﬁxed rate and an ex-post bonus if the employee works
hard. The authors observe that employers choose the bonus contract much more frequently than
the piece-rate contract, and that employees respond to this by putting a lot of effort into both
tasks, and eliciting rewards (in the form of a bonus). Under the piece rate contract, the
unrewarded task is neglected. Falk and Kosfeld (2005) ﬁnd qualitatively the same results in a
similar experiment. Our design is complementary to Fehr and Schmidt’s. Subjects in our
experiment are not offered one contract (in a take-it-or-leave-it manner) but face a menu of
contracts (like in the labour market). In addition, we address the reciprocity among employees
rather than between employees and employers.
Finally, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) pioneer principal-agent models in which the agent
can extend effort in several tasks. They ﬁnd that high-powered incentives for one task can harm
the principal’s objectives by destroying the agent’s incentives to make effort in another task that
is not contractible. We address non-contractible tasks as well, namely cooperation between
workers. In a similar way, Itoh (1991) analyses situations in which an employer prefers to
provide team incentives (eliciting effort on an unobservable ‘helping’ task) as opposed to
individualistic incentives on the observable task only. Our model is a simple version of this
environment: we abstract from the stochastic relation between input and output in Itoh’s model.
122 Theory
We study a game in which individuals choose between a 'public ﬁrm'and ’private ﬁrm’ in a
labour market. In both ﬁrms, two individuals form a team and play a simple production game.
After describing the rules of the game, we study its properties, ﬁrst under the assumption that
individuals are only interested in their own monetary pay-off, and then that (part of) the
population is reciprocal.
The rules of the production game are as follows. The two individuals (labeled 1 and 2)
provide input in two subsequent tasks. In Task 1, each individual i independently chooses effort
ei ∈ {L,H}, where 0 ≤ L < H. In Task 2, after observing the effort of the other individual, each
individual i chooses a reward ri ∈ {0,R}, with 0 < R. The higher effort and reward the higher
the individual’s costs. Individual i pays c(ei) ≤ ei, with c(L) = 0 < c(H) and k(ri) where
k(0) = 0 and R > k(R) > 0. An individual’s effort raises her own output, while her reward raises
the output of her team member (which could be interpreted as helping the other person or being
cooperative with her). More precisely, the relationship between the efforts and the rewards of
players i and j forming one team and the output oi of player i is the following
oi = ei +rj
{i, j} = {1,2}. We assume that individual output is observable by the team manager, while the
input is observable only by the team members and unveriﬁable vis-a-vis the court.




characterises the environment in which the production team operates.
Player i receives the following payment as a function of her output and the output of the other
player:
pi = αoi +(1−α)oj
{i, j} = {1,2}. In other words, α is a measure of the extent to which an individual’s output
determines her payment. In the extreme case α = 1, only her own output determines what she
gets, while the other extreme α = 1
2 indicates that the payments are only based on total team
performance. Note that there is a one-to-one relationship between the ﬁrm’s total output and the
team’s total payment. In other words, more production is to the beneﬁt of both the ﬁrm and the
workers. Table 2.1 summarises the resulting two-stage game.
Proposition 1 characterises the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) for almost all





2 We restrict our attention to situations in which a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, which holds true for
almost all values of α.. In all other cases, in at least one stage of the game, players are indifferent between the two
actions, so that there is a larger range of subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
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Task 1 H L
H H −c(H) αH +(1−α)L−c(H)
L αL+(1−α)H L








, the production game has a unique SPNE. In this










This proposition has two important implications. First, the higher α the higher the output in the
ﬁrst task. Second, the higher α the lower the output in the second task. Observe that the players
reach the Pareto optimum if and only if both play e = H and r = R. In some parametrisations,
this may be an equilibrium outcome for intermediate values of α.
We introduce some restrictions on the parameters. First, we assume that the following
condition holds:
c(H) < H −L (C1)
so that for a strictly positive mass of α’s, effort e = H can be obtained in a SPNE. Second, we
wish to focus on the nontrivial case in which there is no α for which the Pareto efﬁcient outcome
can be achieved in a SPNE, that is:
α1 > α2. (C2)
In the labour market, workers choose between a public ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm. The ﬁrms
differ with respect to their payment scheme. We let INDI [TEAM] denote the game played in the
private [public] ﬁrm, because in the private ﬁrm’s payment scheme has a larger weight on
individual [team] performance than the public ﬁrm. More precisely, if αINDI [αTEAM] denotes
the private [public] ﬁrm’s α, we assume that
α2 < αTEAM < α1 < αINDI.
The following proposition implies that a manager who in interested in high output prefers to
confront the workers with INDI.
14Proposition 2
In equilibrium, in INDI [TEAM], both individuals in the production team choose effort e = H
[e = L] and reward r = 0. Consequently, in INDI, higher total output is realised and hence, all
players choose INDI.
Proof
Follows immediately from Proposition 1.
However, TEAM may yield a better outcome than INDI if the population contains sufﬁciently
many reciprocal individuals, i.e. players who wish to cooperate as long as their team mate does
so as well. A reciprocator plays the following ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy in TEAM: she starts off by
choosing effort e = H in Task 1, and she continues to cooperate by submitting reward r = R in
Task 2 if and only if the other team member chooses the high effort e = H in Task 1 as well.
In order to make things more precise, let us assume that each individual has a value v for
cooperation, i.e., she obtains additional utility v if in TEAM, both she and her team mate play
e = H in the ﬁrst task and r = R in the second. Moreover, it is common knowledge that
individuals draw their value v independently from the same distribution function F which does
not have strictly positive mass outside the interval [v, ¯ v]. In INDI, all choose e = H in the ﬁrst
task, and r = 0 in the second, regardless of what the other player does. Reciprocation is not
triggered in INDI because high effort in Task 1 is a dominant strategy and cannot be interpreted
as an act of cooperation.
TEAM may have two types of equilibria. First, if ¯ v is sufﬁciently high, and F contains
sufﬁcient mass close to ¯ v, all types above [below] a threshold value ˆ v play e = H and r = R
[r = 0]. Second, if F is concentrated in the neighbourhood of 0, all players play e = L and r = 0.
The following proposition makes both claims more precise:
Proposition 3
Suppose the following inequality has a solution in the interval [v, ¯ v] and that ˆ v is the smallest
solution:
v(1−F(v)) ≥ k(R)−R(1−αTEAM). (2.1)
If
αTEAM(H −L+R(1−F(ˆ v))) ≥ c(H) (2.2)
then in the SPNE of TEAM, all types v ≥ ˆ v [v < ˆ v] play e = H and r = R [r = 0]. The ﬁrm’s
output is higher in TEAM than in INDI. Moreover, if (2.1) has no solution, all choose e = L and
r = 0. In that case, the ﬁrm’s output is lower in TEAM than in INDI.
15Proof
Because ˆ v is the smallest v that prefers to choose r = R in Task 2, (2.1) follows from
(R+v)(1−F(v))+F(v)(1−αTEAM)R−k(R) ≥ αTEAMR(1−F(v)). (2.3)
The LHS [RHS] of (2.3) refers to the expected payoff for type v if she chooses r = R [r = 0],
given that all types below v choose r = 0 and all types above v play r = R. Because ˆ v is the
smallest solution, all types above [below] v strictly prefer to play r = R [r = 0]. Equation (2.2)
indicates that all prefer e = H over e = L in Task 1, and follows from
αTEAMR(1−F(ˆ v))+H −c(H) ≥ αTEAML+(1−αTEAM)H. (2.4)
The LHS [RHS] of (2.4) refers to a player’s expected pay-off if she choose e = H [e = L] in
Task 1 and r = 0 in Task 2 if her opponent plays the equilibrium strategy.
The equilibrium described in Proposition 3 states that high effort in the ﬁrst task of TEAM is
feasible in equilibrium under assumption (C2) and the following two additional conditions. First,
there is a type ˆ v that weakly prefers to play r = R rather than r = 0 if she and her team mate
played e = H in the ﬁrst task and if all types v ≥ ˆ v [v < ˆ v] choose e = H and r = R [r = 0].
Second, none of the players prefers to play e = L in the ﬁrst task.3
Now, suppose that individuals can choose between INDI and TEAM. Let us assume that each
individual i has an idiosyncratic belief ˆ Fi about the distribution of v with support [v, ¯ v], and she
believes that all other individuals share this believe. Now, suppose the population only consists
of individuals with a low value v who believe that everybody else has a low value v as well.
Then Proposition 3 implies that all prefer to play INDI rather than TEAM, as this would yield
them H −c(H) instead of L. However, if a player’s belief ˆ Fi assigns sufﬁcient mass to high
values of v, then she has an incentive to enter TEAM as, according to Proposition 4, she expects
that this scheme would give her a higher payoff relative to INDI. The following proposition
makes these claims more precise.
Proposition 4
Suppose the following inequality has a solution in the interval [v, ¯ v] and that ˆ v is the smallest
solution:




H −L+R(1− ˆ Fi(ˆ v))

≥ c(H) (2.6)
Then individual i prefers TEAM over INDI. Her preference is reversed if (2.5) has no solution.
3 A sufﬁcient condition for equation (2.1) having a solution is vmed > 2k(R)−2(1−αTEAM)R, where vmed is the median
value, i.e., F(vmed) = 1
2. It has no solution in the case that all players have value v = 0.
16Proof
If the three conditions are satisﬁed, according to Proposition 3, individual i’s utility in TEAM is
at least H −c(H)+αR(1− ˆ Fi(ˆ v)), which is strictly larger than H −c(H), the utility she would
realise in INDI. In contrast, if (2.5) has no solution, Proposition 3 indicates that individual i’s
utility in TEAM is L, which is strictly smaller than H −c(H) by condition (C1).
The above propositions have several implications. First, if the idiosyncratic beliefs about the
distribution of others’ value to reciprocate vary substantially, individuals may enter in both INDI
and TEAM. Second, individuals who believe that sufﬁciently many others will reciprocate
choose to enter TEAM and play e = H in Task 1. Those who have a sufﬁciently high value of v
will also choose r = R, the others will choose r = 0 in Task 2. Third, a ﬁrm currently using
TEAM incentives can only increase the output by shifting incentives to the INDI scheme if the
conditions of Proposition 3 are not satisﬁed. If they are, the team will produce less output in
INDI than in TEAM.
17183 The experiment
In this section, we describe the design of our experiment and the hypotheses that we wish to test
based on the results from the theory.
3.1 Design
In the year 2004, we ran 9 experimental sessions using two parametrisations of the production
game (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Altogether, 172 students from Tilburg University participated in
the experiment; 166 of them continued into the production game (the remaining students were
dropped when an odd number of them entered either of the two schemes). Participants were paid
for all points they earned in the experiment (on average 13 Euro including a 5 Euro participation
fee for a session lasting approximately 1.5 hours). The experiments took place in English. The
experiments were fully computerised, programmed, and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher
(1999)). Upon arrival at a session, participants were randomly seated at computer cubicles which
were separated by blinds. During the experiment, communication other than via computer was
prohibited.
Of the 172 subjects, 134 participated in the main design (described below), while 38 entered
control sessions (see further below). In each experimental session of the main design, subjects
had to make decisions at four different stages:
1. The trust game
2. A ‘labour market’ in which subjects chose between TEAM and INDI
3. The production game (10 rounds) in the chosen incentive scheme TEAM or INDI
4. The production game (10 rounds) in INDI.
Subjects only received instructions for the stage that they were on, and were not informed about
the stages to follow. Moreover, so as not to contaminate further decision making in the main part
of the experiment, no feedback on the trust game was given before the end of the experiment.
Let us discuss the experiment in detail. We use the trust game to measure subjects’
reciprocity and trust (i.e., their belief in others’ reciprocity). Berg et al. (1995) designed the trust
game to mimic a situation in which two players, a sender and a receiver, can proﬁt if trust exists
between them. The sender has to decide how much of her 10 point endowment to transfer to the
receiver. This money is then tripled and the receiver has to decide how much money (if any) to
return to the sender. In the unique SPNE of the trust game, a money maximising receiver will
return zero, so that a money-maximising sender will transfer zero. However, senders who expect
receivers to be sufﬁciently reciprocal have the incentive to transfer a strictly positive amount of
money. We, therefore, use a subject’s action in the role of sender to evaluate her level of trust,
and her strategy in the role of receiver to measure her level of reciprocity.
19In order to obtain a measure of both trust and reciprocity for each subject, we use a strategy
method behind the veil of ignorance.4 We asked subjects to submit strategies for both roles of
the trust game, i.e., they ﬁrst decided how much to transfer to the receiver in the role of sender,
and then how much to return to the sender for every level of transfer the sender could make. At
the very end of the experimental session, we let the computer decide at random which role each
subject would play and to whom she would be matched. We paid them according to the
strategies they submitted for the role that was assigned by the computer. A measure of a
subject’s trust is how much she transfers in the role of sender (which is an integer between 0 and
10).5 A measure of a subject’s reciprocity is the average fraction she returns in the role of
receiver (which is a number between 0 and 1).
In the second stage of the experiment, we present subjects with a choice between the
production games INDI and TEAM. Four sessions used parametrisation P1 and three sessions
parametrisation P2, see Table 3.1. These parametrisations result in the pay-off matrices depicted
in Table 3.2. The intuition behind the choice of parametrisations P1 and P2 is that in P1 subjects
have more reason to deviate from the cooperative outcome than in P2. As a result, individuals
will be less likely to be triggered to show reciprocal behaviour in P1 than in P2. If an odd
number of subjects chose either scheme, one or two subjects were randomly excluded from
continuing in the experiment, so that we could match the subjects into pairs. In each round, a
subject was assigned to another anonymous co-player from among the subjects who chose the
same scheme. This matching procedure was known to the subjects.
After subjects participated in these ﬁrst 10 rounds, we informed them that they would play 10
more rounds. This time, however, we paid all of the subjects according to INDI. We rematched
them after each round, but only among those who chose the same scheme. Having also ﬁnished
these 10 rounds, the subjects learned the results of the trust game and their accumulated earnings
for the whole experiment, and were paid by us in cash.
In order to evaluate the effect of sorting, we ran a control session for each parametrisation,
with 18 and 20 subjects in P1 and P2 respectively. In both control sessions, the procedures were
kept as similar to the other sessions as possible. Subjects submitted the trust game strategies, and
then played 10 rounds of the production game under TEAM incentives in the given
parametrisation. Afterwards, we informed subjects that they would participate in 10 more rounds
and we exposed them to the TEAM scheme in the other parametrisation. We chose this approach
so as to let subjects earn approximately the same amount of income as in the other sessions. In
our analysis, we only compare TEAM without self-selection in rounds 1 to 10 to TEAM with
4 Vyrastekova and Onderstal (2005) discuss this design and compare it to the standard trust game design.
5 We are aware of the fact that the sender’s motivation to transfer money in the trust game may go beyond the belief in
positive reciprocity (Charness (2004)). For instance, risk and betrayal aversion might affect sender’s decision to send
money in the trust game (see Schechter (2005) and Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) respectively). However, there is
evidence in the literature that using transfers as a measure of belief in reciprocity is reasonable (see Vyrastekova and
Garikipati (2005)).
20Table 3.1 Experiment parametrisations of the production games
Parametrisation P1 Parametrisation P2
Number of sessions 4 3
















Table 3.2 Experiment payoff matrices of the production games
Parametrisation P1 Parametrisation P2
INDI TEAM INDI TEAM
Task 1 H L Task 1 H L Task 1 H L Task 1 H L
H 6 4 H 6 0 H 6 4 H 6 − 1
L 4 2 L 8 2 L 2 0 L 7 0
Task 2 R 0 Task 2 R 0 Task 2 R 0 Task 2 R 0
R 8 − 6 R 8 − 2 R 6 − 6 R 6 − 1
0 14 0 0 10 0 0 12 0 0 7 0
self-selection (rounds 1 to 10 as well).
3.2 Hypotheses
The theoretical results of Section 2 provide a set of testable hypotheses concerning the ﬁrm
subjects choose and their behaviour in these ﬁrms. In this subsection, we formulate the three
hypotheses that we test using experimental data. Under the null hypotheses, we maintain the
assumption of money-maximising subjects, while under the alternatives, we assume (beliefs in)
reciprocal preferences.
Hypothesis 1: Self-selection
(H0) All subjects select INDI and in this scheme, e = H in Task 1 and r = 0 in Task 2. (HA)
Subjects who select INDI, opt for e = H in Task 1 and r = 0 in Task 2. Subjects with high trust
select TEAM and e = H in Task 1. Those who (1) select TEAM, (2) are sufﬁciently reciprocal,
and (3) observe history H,H in Task 1 choose r = R in Task 2, the others who select TEAM
choose r = 0 in Task 2.
21As a consequence of the alternative in hypothesis 1, subjects entering TEAM will end up earning
higher average proﬁts than subjects entering INDI. In TEAM, two reciprocal subjects together
earn 2R > 0, a reciprocal and a nonreciprocal individual will earn R−k(R) > 0, and two
nonreciprocal individuals will earn 0. This is more than in INDI, where subjects always earn 0.
Self-selection into TEAM is less likely in P1 than in P2 because in P1, the critical conditions
(2.5) and (2.6) on a subject’s belief ˆ Fi to choose TEAM are stricter: v(1− ˆ Fi(v)) ≥ 2 and
ˆ Fi(ˆ v) ≤ 4
5 versus v(1− ˆ Fi(v)) ≥ 1 and ˆ Fi(ˆ v) ≤ 6
7.
Next, we spell out the hypothesis most relevant for policy: does a team produce more the
higher the power of the incentive scheme?
Hypothesis 2: The power of incentives
(H0) Subjects who selected TEAM produce more in INDI than in TEAM. (HA) Those who
selected TEAM produce less in INDI than in TEAM.
Finally, we address the question, to which extent self-selection contributes to TEAM
outperforming INDI - if it does at all. Subjects may select TEAM to express their willingness to
provide high effort without explicit monetary incentives. We refer to this aspect as sorting. It is
especially relevant when we think of public ﬁrms operating under team-based incentives. The
incentive scheme is usually known to the workers entering the ﬁrm beforehand, i.e. it is one of
the factors upon which they select the ﬁrm. If sorting matters then it generates a reason for the
public ﬁrm to stick to TEAM incentives. We can evaluate the role of sorting for the success of
team-based incentives by comparing the behaviour of subjects in TEAM who self-selected this
scheme, to subjects who were forced to play TEAM. If more cooperation is found in the former
group, then sorting is responsible for at least part of the success of TEAM.
Hypothesis 3: Sorting
(H0) Subjects who select TEAM when they can choose between TEAM and INDI produce the
same output as those who are forced to play TEAM. (HA) Subjects who select TEAM when they
can choose between TEAM and INDI produce more output than those who are forced to play
TEAM.
Hypothesis 3 points out that initial sorting of subjects into TEAM and INDI may result in higher
payoffs for subjects in TEAM. The driving force may be that those who choose TEAM trust
more and are more reciprocal than those choosing INDI. If all subjects are forced to play TEAM,
less reciprocity may be realised, so that the output in TEAM ends up being lower than it would
be under sorting. We use the data from our control sessions to evaluate hypothesis 3.
224 Data analysis
In this section, we address the three hypotheses formulated above. We reject the ﬁrst null
hypothesis for parametrisation P1, and all null hypotheses for P2, but not always in favour of the
alternative hypothesis. Before discussing these observations in more detail, we wish to note that
the ﬁndings in our trust game set-up do not differ substantially from the observations in Berg
et al. (1995) (quoted in parentheses). In our experiment, senders tranfer, on average, 51% (52%)
of their endowment to receivers, while 9% (6%) of them send nothing. The average return by
receiver, as a fraction of sender’s expenditure is 1.08 (0.89).
4.1 Self-selection
A substantial fraction of subjects chooses TEAM in both parametrisations: 34% in P1 and 44%
in P2. This ﬁnding allows us to reject the null hypothesis that all select INDI. The fact that more
subjects choose TEAM in parametrisation P2 is consistent with the prediction of Proposition 3,
although the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present subjects’
choices in the trust game conditional on the ﬁrm they selected the labour market.
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From Figures 4.1 and 4.2, it becomes clear that those who choose TEAM have both more trust
and higher reciprocity. Subjects selecting INDI send on average 4.6 points while those selecting
TEAM send signiﬁcantly more, 5.5 points (one-sided Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.049).
Subjects selecting TEAM return a fraction that leaves senders’ investment proﬁtable (i.e., more
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selected INDI selected TEAM
than one third of the received number of points), unlike subjects selecting INDI who return less
than senders sent to them.
Table 4.1 includes Probit estimates for the choice of TEAM. The outcomes show that there is
a non-linear relationship between trust and reciprocity on one hand, and the choice of the ﬁrm on
the other. Both trust and reciprocity have a positive effect on the choice of TEAM (as we have
just observed using non-parametric tests). However, the interaction term is negative and
(weakly) signiﬁcant. Its parameter estimate implies that given values of trust [reciprocity] above
7 [0.57], higher reciprocity [trust] makes entry into TEAM less likely.
Table 4.1 Probit estimates of choice of TEAM. The coefﬁcients are expressed as marginal effects.
Variable Coefﬁcient estimate Standard error
Trust 0.057* 0.024
Reciprocity 0.740* 0.330
Trust * reciprocity − 0.100** 0.052
P2-dummy − 0.059 0.089
# observations 134
Log Likelihood − 85.44
* indicates signiﬁcance at less than 5%.
** indicates signiﬁcance at less than 10%.
24This observation has two implications. First, we reject null hypothesis 1 in favour of its
alternative: more trust makes entry into TEAM more probable. Second, TEAM may attract
‘free-riders’: people who believe that sufﬁciently many other are reciprocators, without having
the attention to reciprocate themselves. In other words, these subjects may imitate behaviour of
reciprocators in Task 1, but free-ride on them in Task 2. Consequently, TEAM scheme attracts
reciprocal as well as money-maximising subjects, as long as their trust is sufﬁciently high.
Observe that the P2-dummy (that equals 1 if subject participates in parametrisation P2) is not
signiﬁcantly different from zero. This implies that the hypothesis is rejected that subjects in P1
are more likely to choose INDI than those in P2.
Observation 1a (Self-selection):
A nonnegligible fraction of subjects (more than one third in either of the two parametrisations)
selects TEAM. On average, subjects who do so trust more and are more reciprocal than subjects
who opt for INDI. However, money-maximisers also enter TEAM, generating free-rider
problems.
We now turn to analysing subjects’ strategies in the ﬁrm of their choice. Figure 4.3 depicts their
behaviour in Task 1.



























P1- INDI P1 - TEAM P2 - INDI P2 - TEAM
From Figure 4.3, we derive that in Task 1, subjects in INDI choose nearly exclusively e = H
(which is a dominant strategy). Also in TEAM, we observe e = H: in parametrisation P1 [P2] on
average 31% [69%] of subjects choose e = H. In the light of Proposition 3, this observation is
25somewhat surprising: we expect someone who enters TEAM to always play e = H, hoping that
her team mate will choose r = R in Task 2. One explanation for this discrepancy is that subjects
entered TEAM by mistake. There is indeed support for this suggestion. Subjects choosing e = L
in TEAM send signiﬁcantly less points in the trust game than subjects choosing e = H in the
same scheme (5.2 points vs. 6.1 points in P1 and 4.1 points vs. 6.4 points in P2 with p-values of
the Mann-Whitney U tests being p = 0.059 and p = 0.000, respectively). This means that their
trust is lower than for subjects entering TEAM who choose e = H. However, low trust implies
that they should prefer INDI (see Proposition 3).
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P2 - TEAM after (H,H)
P2- TEAM after (L,H), (H,L) or (L,L)
P2 - INDI
Figure 4.4 indicates that high effort in Task 2 is much more likely in TEAM than in INDI,
especially if both subjects gave high effort in Task 1. We use a conditional logit model to further
investigate this observation (see Table 4.2 for the estimationresults). This speciﬁcation accounts
for subject-speciﬁc effects that are likely to be correlated and to affect the behaviour of a subject
in both Tasks. For instance, reciprocal subjects might be more likely to believe that others are
reciprocal, so that they choose high effort in the Task 1, and these might be the same subjects
who are more inclined to reciprocate in the Task 2. Indeed, we observe that those who choose
r = R in TEAM are more likely to be reciprocators than those who choose r = 0. The former
return on average 51% [39%] of the received amount to the sender in P1 [P2], while the latter
return on average 39% [25%]. The difference is signiﬁcant in both cases (Mann–Whitney U test,
p = 0.090 [p = 0.008]). Thus, without any controls, we would overestimate the coefﬁcient
describing the effect of high effort on the probability of reciprocation. For both P1 and P2
parametrisations, it is apparent that the probability of choosing r = R is highest when both
players chose e = H in Task 1 (the coefﬁcients on any other history observed is signiﬁcant and
negative), supporting the equilibrium derived in Proposition 3.
26Table 4.2 Conditional Logit model estimates for the probability of r=R in Stage 2 (standard errors between
parentheses).
Task 1 action e ∈ {L,H} Parametrisation
Player Co-player P1 P2
H H reference group reference group
H L − 1.54 (0.64) − 3.41 (0.85)
L H − 1.63 (0.68) − 3.13 (0.89)
L L − 1.91 (0.61) − 1.98 (0.96)
Number of observations 190 120
Dropped (no variation) 130 60
Log likelihood − 70.809 − 32.249
Observation 1b (Self-selection):
Those who select TEAM and observe history H,H in Task 1 are more likely to choose r = R in
Task 2 than those who observe another history. For subjects who are more reciprocal, this effect
is stronger.
4.2 The power of incentives
Is it economically proﬁtable to increase the power of the incentive scheme? Table 4.3
summarises the economic performance of INDI and TEAM. It contains the average proﬁts per
subject and round in the self-selected scheme in both parametrisations. In P1 [P2], selecting
INDI is signiﬁcantly more [less] proﬁtable than TEAM for both the ﬁrm and the workers.
Moreover, in both parametrisations, individuals who self-select into TEAM earn signiﬁcantly
more than the payoff predicted by the Nash equilibrium for this scheme.
Table 4.3 Average and Nash equilibrium payoffs per subject per round in the selfselected scheme (rounds 1 to
10) and MannWhitney U test (standard errors between parentheses).





INDI 6.6 (0.20) 4.6 (0.28)
TEAM 6.3 (0.16) 6.6 (0.39)
Mann-Whitney U test INDI-TEAM p=0.000 p=0.002
These observations suggest that the ﬁrm can increase output by switching from TEAM to INDI
in parametrisation P1, but not in P2. We now report the impact of doing so on the behaviour of
27the subjects in the last stage of the experiment, in which all played INDI. Figures 4.5 and 4.6
display actions chosen in rounds 11 to 20 in Task 1 and Task 2, respectively. They correspond
closely to the SPNE.
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28Table 4.4 presents the average payoffs for those who chose TEAM in both TEAM (periods 1 to
10) and in INDI (periods 11 to 20). The economic performance of the subjects who chose
TEAM signiﬁcantly changes with they are forced to play INDI. However, the change is not
unidirectional. In parametrisation P1, we observe a signiﬁcant increase in earnings (although the
average earnings still fall short of the Nash equilibrium prediction). The opposite is found in
parametrisation P2. Note that these observations cannot be related to the subject pool
composition, because subjects are informed and are matched in the same subset of the pool as
when they play according to the self-selected scheme.
Table 4.4 Average and Nash equilibrium payoffs for 10 rounds in the forced payment scheme COMP only for
subjects who previously self-selected into COOP.





TEAM (rounds 1-10) 4.6 (0.28) 6.1 (0.11)
INDI (round 11-20) 6.6 (0.39) 6.1 (0.18)
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test p=0.001 p=0.044
Observation 2 (Team vs. individual incentives):
Subjects who choose TEAM, when exposed to INDI, improve performance in parametrisation
P1, but not in P2.
4.3 Sorting
We have observed that in P2, TEAM performs better than INDI. Is the success of TEAM
explained by the fact that reciprocal subjects choose TEAM in the labour market? We compare
the actions in the production game in Figure 7 (Task 1) and Figure 8 (Task 2) with the control
group which was forced to play TEAM. We ﬁnd that in P1, sorting has no effect (p = 0.909
Mann-Whitney U test). However, in parametrisation P2, subjects earn signiﬁcantly more in the
sessions when they sort themselves into TEAM than when we force them to do so (p = 0.016
Mann-Whitney U test). More speciﬁcally, those who self-select are signiﬁcantly more likely to
choose e = H in Task 1 (Mann-Whitney U test, p = 0.012), and r = R in Task 2 (Mann-Whitney
U test, p = 0.005).6
6 In P2, subjects who are forced to play TEAM perform worse than subject who choose INDI, in contrast to those who
choose TEAM.
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P2 - control TEAM after (H,H)
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Observation 3 (Sorting):
The impact of sorting on subjects’ behaviour in TEAM is small in parametrisation P1. In
contrast, in P2, those who are forced to play TEAM perform worse than those who select team
when they have the opportunity to choose between INDI and TEAM. In other words, sorting
partially explains why the increase in the power of the incentive scheme may have
counterproductive effects.
305 Conclusions
The question of properly incentivising workers in public ﬁrms has been on the agenda for some
time. High-powered incentives and proper measures of individual performance stand high on the
list of policy instruments that should improve the performance of the public sector. In this paper,
we have addressed the question of whether public ﬁrms perform better when they increase the
power of their workers’ incentive schemes. We have answered this question using a laboratory
experiment. Our subjects could choose between a ‘public’ and a ‘private’ ﬁrm offering
low-powered and high-powered incentives respectively. Afterwards, subjects played a two-task
production game in the ﬁrm they selected. In Task 1, they produced their own output, while in
Task 2, they could increase the output of the colleague in their team. We measured subjects’ trust
and reciprocity using an auxiliary trust game experiment.
In our experiment, a substantial fraction of subjects opted for the public ﬁrm, contrasting
with the predictions of standard theory. Moreover, production increased under higher-powered
incentives in parametrisation P1, but not in P2. We found two explanations for this observation.
First, in P2, subjects have less reason to deviate from the cooperative outcome than in P1. As a
result, reciprocal behaviour is more likely to be triggered in P2. Second, we observe that in P2,
sorting explains why the public ﬁrm performs better under low-powered incentives than under
high-powered incentives. When all subjects are forced to opt for the public ﬁrm, its output
decreases relative to the situation in which subjects can choose between the public ﬁrm and the
private ﬁrm.
The policy implications of our experiment are as follows: A public ﬁrm may or may not
perform better if the power of workers’ incentive schemes is increased. If the interdependency
between workers is high and difﬁcult to observe, and their incentive to cooperate is high in the
case of a low-powered incentive scheme, a higher-powered incentive scheme may imply worse
outcomes. For example, one may think of case managers at employment services, who often
have to rely on their mutual expertise to ﬁnd suitable jobs for their clients. Similar
interdependencies may exist between medical doctors and police ofﬁcers. In contrast, when the
gain from the unobservable tasks is low, then introducing individualistic incentives is the
preferred choice. One more policy option is to strengthen the advantages of team pay, that is,
develop sorting mechanisms to attract reciprocal workers, or strengthen signalling mechanisms
within the organisation.
According to our knowledge, our experiments are the ﬁrst to disantangle the impact of
workers’ sorting themselves into ﬁrms with various incentive schemes and the role of signalling
for the success of team-based incentives. Morever, by using the auxiliary trust game expeirment,
we are able to link the performance of teams to trust and reciprocity, lending support to the
theories relying on these explanations (e.g. Lazear (2000b)). Finally, we wish to note that we
used a very cautious design. Our subjects did not have the opportunity to sort themselves into
31teams endogenously or to build reputation. If subjects are able to form groups endogenously on
the basis of historical information or repeated interaction, this could alleviate the free-rider
problem. These options remain open for future research.7
7 Keser and Montmarquette (2004) is a promising ﬁrst step.
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